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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the first book of J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, the 
philosopher’s stone was the sought after giver of eternal life, of 
immortality, for anyone who possessed it.1  Lord Voldemort needed it; 
Harry Potter ultimately prevented him from getting it. 
 * Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland, Australia.  The author 
wishes to thank Peter Cane, Jules Coleman, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Grant Huscroft, 
Richard Kay, Rande Kostal, Brian Leiter, Richard Posner, Maimon Schwarzschild, John 
Smillie, and Steven Smith for their comments, suggestions, criticisms, and advice. 
 1. The title of the first Harry Potter book in Rowling’s native Britain was Harry 
Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone.  This title was changed by her publishers for the 
North American audience to Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.  Since that first 
book in the Harry Potter series, Ms. Rowling’s publishers have not been in a position to 
insist on a different title for the U.S. market—for obvious reasons. 




In the rather less exciting world of legal academia, possessors of the 
philosopher’s stone would measure their immortality not in terms of the 
infinite or eternal but in far more prosaic terms—say, 50 or 100 years.  
Any legal academic who writes a book or article that is still being widely 
read in a century (or even half a century) can be thought of as having 
achieved a sort of immortality. 
And yet even in these vastly more circumscribed terms it is still an 
exclusive club indeed.  Confine yourself to the Anglo-American common 
law world and who, today, could be said to possess the philosopher’s 
stone?  Holmes for sure2 and Bentham as well.3  After that it gets harder 
and more debatable, though soon to join Holmes would assuredly be 
Hart4 and Fuller.5  Dworkin may, or may not, stand the test of time.6 
It turns out, then, that the vast preponderance of legal articles and 
legal books—and no doubt of all articles and all books—that are written 
have a pretty short shelf half-life.  Even where 50 or 100 years are as 
good as immortality gets, very few writers will end up in possession of 
the philosopher’s stone.  And, to digress, one lesson we might all draw 
from that humbling realization is that lots and lots of academics today 
clearly take themselves too seriously. 
Were one asked to nominate a shortlist of legal academics in their 
prime today who might just beat the overwhelming odds and end up 
possessing the philosopher’s stone, my view is that Jeremy Waldron 
would have to be very high up on any such list.  And what would 
Waldron—50 or 100 years from now—be best known for?  Surely it 
would be for his strong defence of the elected legislature against the 
 2. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), is said to be 
the most read legal article ever.  Certainly it is still widely read today. 
 3. Jeremy Bentham wrote many, many works on law.  The most read today may 
be JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Metheun & Co. 1970) [hereinafter 
BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION], or his attack on the French declaration of the 
rights of man in JEREMY BENTHAM, RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE 
UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Philip Schofield et al. 
eds., 2002). 
 4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) is considered by many to be 
the best single book on legal philosophy ever.  It, too, is still widely read today.  See, 
e.g., NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART (2004); Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking 
Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852 (2006).  It seems a safe bet to say this book will be widely 
read even 100 years after its publication. 
 5. Lon Fuller might seem a more controversial pick.  But if nothing else his The 
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949), will continue to be 
read.  And in the last few years Fuller has undergone something of a renaissance. 
 6. For a resoundingly negative assessment of Ronald Dworkin’s staying power, 
see Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2005). 
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pretensions and purported moral superiority of the unelected judiciary.7  
As Waldron himself notes, when writing in an overseas journal, “I am 
known as a fanatical opponent of strong judicial review in the US 
States.”8 
The gist of Waldron’s argument is this.  He starts from a strong rights 
perspective, one that does not see rights as ultimately resting on some 
sort of consequentialist foundation.9  From that strong rights starting 
point—where rights are understood as goods in themselves and each 
individual seen as an autonomous agent—Waldron reminds us that each 
of us also has a right to participate in social decisionmaking.  Indeed, 
this right to participate stands as a sort of right of rights.  And it exists in 
the context of a world in which disagreement is a fact of social life—
disagreement that takes place between reasonable, well-meaning, smart, 
even nice people and does so on questions over which the unelected 
judiciary has no obviously greater moral perspicacity than anyone else.  
In such circumstances, bills of rights, and the privileged position they 
afford the judiciary, are highly suspect because they fail to take seriously 
this right to participate in social decisionmaking; “decisions about rights 
made by legislatures [ought not] to be second-guessed by courts.”10  In 
other words, Waldron has turned the strong rights-based arguments 
grounded in autonomy and equality—arguments relied on by so many 
bill of rights supporters—back on to those same people who defend the 
unique role such instruments give to unelected judges. 
So for Waldron we should all have a right to participate in social 
decisionmaking, even as regards decisions about rights—how rights 
ought to relate to one another, when they can justifiably be limited, what 
is their proper scope and range, and more.  This right to participate, this 
Waldronian right of rights, should not be handed over to a small group 
of unelected judges—to committees of ex-lawyers, as Waldron likes to 
 7. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) 
[hereinafter Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review]; Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based 
Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993) [hereinafter 
Waldron, Right-Based Critique]. 
 8. Jeremy Waldron, Compared to What? Judicial Activism and New Zealand’s 
Parliament, N.Z.L.J., Dec. 2005, at 441, 442. 
 9. For my distinction between strong rights foundations and weak rights 
foundations, see James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s 
Quandary, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 340–42 (1996). 
 10. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1360. 




say, who ironically resolve disputes among themselves by voting, by 
majority rules, not on the basis of who crafts the most substantively 
moral judgment or the one with the most references to Mill, Milton, or 
one’s favoured human rights convention. 
Of course that is a distortingly brief précis of an argument that 
Waldron has elaborated upon in more than fifteen articles and two 
books.11  I trace it out here, however briefly, simply to indicate in 
general terms the sort of strong anti-bill of rights or anti-judicial review 
of primary legislation position for which Waldron is likely to be 
remembered.  It will be this, if anything, that seemingly will win 
Waldron possession of the philosopher’s stone and legal academia’s 
equivalent of immortality. 
At this point I should lay my cards on the table and also admit that I 
find Waldron’s anti-bill of rights writings overwhelmingly persuasive.12  
To the extent I differ from Waldron it is predominantly due to my 
thinking that rights must ultimately be understood and justified in 
consequentialist terms.  I take a weak-rights perspective; Waldron seems 
to take a strong-rights perspective.  Yet on the whole issue of the proper 
role of an unelected judiciary in a well-established democracy, I put 
myself emphatically in the Waldronian camp.  In the American context 
at least and probably these days in the rest of the common law world 
save for Australia, this sort of anti-bill of rights, pro-legislature, pro-
Waldron perspective is clearly a minority viewpoint.  Yet it is one to 
which I more or less fully subscribe. 
That needs to be made clear.  It needs to be made clear because the 
rest of this Article will take issue with recent claims Waldron has made 
in the Harvard Law Review.13  His recent claims are that unelected 
American judges, in the process of deciding hard cases—even Bill of 
Rights cases—“would be churlish and irrational to ignore the guidance 
of whatever consensus has been reached among the nations on this 
 11. Waldron lists all of these himself.  Id. at 1352–53 n.19. 
 12. Indeed, I have myself written against bills of rights and the exalted—I would 
say illegitimate—place they accord the judiciary.  See JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY AND 
ANTIPATHY (2002); James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 
(2003); James Allan, An Unashamed Majoritarian, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 537 (2004); 
Allan, supra note 9; James Allan, Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land, 30 FED. L. 
REV. 561 (2002); James Allan, Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining 
Judges in the Twenty-First Century, 17 K.C.L.R. 1 (2006); James Allan, Rights, 
Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS (Grant Huscroft & Paul 
Rishworth eds., 2002); James Allan, Paying for the Comfort of Dogma, 25 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 63 (2003); James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again—Conceptions of Democracy, 25 
LAW & PHIL. 533 (2006). 
 13. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (2005). 
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point,”14 or at least any reticence they might feel “does not preclude 
turning to the legal consensus of civilized nations for assistance.”15 
In brief, in his Foreign Law paper Waldron lays out “a theory of the 
citation of foreign law”16—an argument defending the appropriateness 
of citing or deferring to the law of nations, at least sometimes, including 
in controversial Bill of Rights cases before the Supreme Court on issues 
such as “whether the Eighth Amendment forbids the juvenile death 
penalty.”17  Indeed, Waldron is explicit: 
If these issues have been wrestled with in a number of other jurisdictions, then 
our commitment to the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end 
product of their labors for guidance. . . .  [T]he accumulated legal wisdom of 
mankind, embodied in ius gentium, may still have something to offer us.18 
I will argue that Waldron’s argument for citing foreign law is 
unconvincing in the context of bills of rights and rests on a dubious 
analogy.  Worse, I will assert that Waldron’s underlying thesis in this 
recent Foreign Law paper is at odds with the core of his own anti-
judicial review, anti-bill of rights position. 
Of course Waldron’s Foreign Law paper is elegant, stylish, 
exceedingly learned, and replete with erudition.  What it is not, though, 
is consistent with the body of Waldron’s own earlier works which he 
himself describes as articulating a “fanatical [opposition to] strong 
judicial review in the US . . . .”19  Put differently, there appears to me to 
be a lack of analytical consistency between what Waldron says in his 
Foreign Law paper and what he says in those books and articles that 
may one day give him philosopher’s stone immortality. 
I will attempt to defend that claim in three steps.  Step one involves a 
rather detailed consideration of, and rejection of, an analogy that 
Waldron explicitly puts at the very heart of the aforementioned claims 
he makes in his Foreign Law paper—claims I put to one side until we 
have considered the analogy itself. 
 14. Id. at 140. 
 15. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).  Waldron does not tell the reader how one is to 
determine which nations fall under the aegis of “civilized” and which do not, though 
being democratic is presumably a key criterion. 
 16. Id. at 146. 
 17. Id. at 140. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Waldron, supra note 8, at 442. 




II.  THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE 
ESTABLISHED BODY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 
Throughout this Foreign Law paper Waldron places great weight on 
one particular analogy, an analogy to scientific problem solving: 
I have invoked the image of science and of scientific problem-solving several 
times to illustrate how a foreign law consensus may be relevant to U.S. legal 
decisionmaking.20 
[A] consensus in either the law or the natural sciences can be wrong.  In neither 
field, however, is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to the 
established body of findings to which others have contributed over the years.21 
It relies instead on the idea that solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law 
might get established in the way that scientific theories are established.  They do 
not get established as infallible, they change over the years, and there are always 
outliers who refuse to accept them—some cranky, some whose reluctance leads 
eventually to progress.22 
[T]hat does not preclude turning to the legal consensus of civilized nations for 
assistance anymore than the American origin of an epidemic precludes 
Americans’ turning to foreign scientists for guidance.23 
And so on and so on repeatedly. 
To begin this attack on that analogy, let us first consider alternative 
medicine, then global warming and a few other examples before 
returning to Waldron’s epidemic example.  To what extent is it the case 
that it is some sort of widespread consensus—or rather a consensus of 
experts—that provides us with knowledge of and in the external, causal 
world?  And is there anything lying behind that consensus—some sort of 
mind-independent, imposed reality—that is ultimately doing the work in 
the scientific realm, something not obviously underlying or propping up 
any legal consensus that may emerge when appealing to or citing foreign 
law?  Have Waldron’s polemical skills outpaced the demands of 
accuracy and fairness, or at least led him to mischaracterize what was in 
dispute, when he says: 
Natural law jurisprudence never used to be a matter of individuals just inserting 
their own moral judgments into legal reasoning, any more than natural science 
was ever just a matter of idiosyncratic observations about energy or gravity.24 
 20. Waldron, supra note 13, at 143. 
 21. Id. at 139. 
 22. Id. at 144. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
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A.  Alternative Medicine 
How would one assess the claims to respectability of the various sorts 
of alternative medicine treatments on offer, from homeopathy, acupuncture, 
and echinacea to aromatherapy, magnetic resonance zones, or anything 
with the word holistic before it?  A double-blind drug trial would seem 
to be a good starting point, at least where the suggested remedy can be 
given or not given with neither the patient nor doctor knowing if this is a 
placebo or the proffered remedy.  Indeed, this sort of double-blind test of 
efficacy is the gold standard.  No room is left for attributing causation 
and differential outcomes to social expectations, individual psychology, 
the placebo effect, or the observed fact that most people, for most 
illnesses, simply get better on their own—whether they take nothing, a 
sugar pill, or some unbelievably diluted addition to water. 
Notice that nothing in this sort of double-blind trial is inconsistent 
with “overlap, duplication, mutual elaboration, and the checking and 
rechecking of results that is characteristic of true science.”25  Indeed we 
would expect such trials, and tests of efficacy generally, to make as 
sophisticated a use as possible of statistics, meta-analysis, computer 
modeling and attempts to control for more than one possible causal 
agent, not to mention sorting out causation from correlation. 
We can happily concede all that.  And yet, when we come to pass 
judgment on, say, the efficacy of echinacea or homeopathy, we need to 
be very clear (in a way Waldron is not) just what it is we are “checking 
and rechecking [our] results”26 against.  Is it against the opinions of all 
the professors of the Harvard University Faculty of Medicine?  Is some 
consensus of their views (perhaps augmented by the views of medical 
professors at the universities of Oxford, Toronto, and Melbourne), in and 
of itself, determinative of whether homeopathy or chemotherapy or 
antibiotics or echinacea can actually reverse the course of illnesses and 
make people better? 
If anyone be inclined to answer “yes” to this last query, stop and put 
yourself in the shoes of the Dean of Medicine at Harvard University.  
Against what does he or she assess effectiveness and check results?  The 
whole edifice of science rests on the premise that the answer here is not 
just “the consensus of views of the other expert doctors.”  Penicillin does 
 25. Id. at 138–39. 
 26. Id. at 139. 




not save millions of lives just because a coterie of top doctors thinks it 
does.  Homeopathy and echinacea are not worthless, no better than sugar 
pill idiocies, simply due to the fact that 99.9% of top medical experts 
surveyed ticked the “worthless” box.  Penicillin would not stop working 
for no other reason than that the two—or five, or thirteen, or twenty-five 
—most recently appointed medical professors at Harvard have now 
decided it will. 
The point is a simple one, but one left obscured by Waldron’s 
analogy.  Science rests on a belief that we all live in a material world; 
that there is an external, causal world of which we are a part; that 
Berkeley was wrong27 and that Hume was right;28 that there exists a 
mind-independent world out there that imposes outcomes on all us 
humans no matter how we may have been socialized or inculcated.  
Penicillin works because of a mind-independent truth about the way the 
world works and about the interactions of antibiotics with the human 
body. 
In that sense, while it is true that science is not “just a matter of 
idiosyncratic observations about energy or gravity,”29 it is equally true 
that the whole scientific method and worldview—not to mention the 
general enlightenment way of thinking—starts from precisely those 
observations about our external, causal world.  It is just those observations 
that are the basis of ever more sophisticated attempts to draw 
conclusions about how our world is structured and the cause and effect 
laws that govern it—independently of whatever we, or even Harvard 
professors, may happen to think. 
 27. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE 326–31 (Colin Murray Turbaybe ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1970) (1710).  
Perhaps the correct term is not so much wrong as weird—thinking that the universe 
would disappear if God did not keep looking at it does not, strictly speaking, have 
implications for the scientific method or even, arguably, for the notion of causality.  At 
least I think it does not. 
 28. See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-
Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739).  Hume began by conceding that we 
could not prove, in a deductive way, the existence of an external, causal world.  All of 
our information comes from our senses.  We have no direct contact with such a world.  It 
is logically possible that such a world does not exist, that Berkeley is right.  But no one 
believes that.  We all naturally believe that such a mind-independent world exists.  Any 
modern day postmodernist English professor who purports to doubt it, or to adopt a 
radical antifoundationalism, or to suggest all knowledge is, say, socially constructed, 
needs only to be shown to his eighth floor office window and asked to jump.  He will 
not.  As Hume argued, deep down the self-proclaimed radical skeptic too believes in a 
mind-independent, external, causal world which imposes outcomes on all us humans 
however we may have been socialised or inculcated or whether we be male or female, 
rich or poor.  Relatedly, see ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE 
(Picador USA 1998), in particular chapter four. 
 29. Waldron, supra note 13, at 138. 
ALLAN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:30:03 PM 
[VOL. 45:  133, 2008]  Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 141 
 
Seen in that way, the consensus of experts in a particular scientific 
field still matters—but it matters in an indirect, evidential way because it 
is such a strong indication of what is likely to be true in the external, 
causal world.  These people, who have spent their lives studying and testing 
the complex causal interactions, have far more expertise than we do.  If a 
consensus of such experts in some scientific area is that X is the case, 
then odds are overwhelming that X, in fact, is the case.  Such experts are 
not infallible of course.  A seeming crank, every once in a while, will be 
proved correct.  But she will be proved correct because her views are 
open to testing and potential falsifying and because, over time, the 
evidence builds up on her side (as it did with the expanding universe 
theory, say). 
This is the only way to make sense of the claims to mind-independent 
truth that science makes.  It is the only nonmysterious, nonmystical way 
to understand the presumptive force of any consensus of experts in the 
realms of science.  It is the only basis for labeling much of alternative 
medicine as “rubbish.” 
What Waldron nowhere provides in Foreign Law, and what I think 
simply cannot be provided, is any reason for any of us to believe that 
law30 is analogous to science in so far as what it is that underlies and 
supports a consensus of opinion in the two realms.  More specifically, 
when American judges are pondering “whether the Eighth Amendment 
forbids the juvenile death penalty,”31 and they look overseas and happen 
to note a consensus of legal opinion amongst, say, western European and 
Canadian judges on that question, Waldron’s analogy suggests that the 
legal consensus of those overseas judges somehow sits atop a body of 
mind-independent, imposed-on-humans truths, as it does in the scientific 
realm. 
If it were otherwise and the legal consensus of the European and 
Canadian judges did not rest on any mind-independent, same-cause-
 30. The same could be said, and of course has been said, of morality.  
Noncognitivists or moral skeptics say just this—that when it comes to values and valuing 
there are no mind-independent truths.  Facts and values are distinct in just this way.  And 
oddly, Waldron is a self-proclaimed noncognitivist in the moral realm.  See, e.g., Jeremy 
Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 75, 75 & n.1 (1998).  Of 
course one could believe there are, in fact, mind-independent moral truths but not mind-
independent legal truths. 
 31. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140. 




inevitably-leading-to-same-effect type testable truths,32 then there would 
be at least some initial grounds for wondering why unelected American 
judges interpreting a Constitution which is next to impossible to change 
and whose decision in this area could not be overturned or reversed by 
statute should be paying heed to that foreign law consensus.  Or at any 
rate, one might expect Jeremy Waldron—that strong advocate of a democratic 
right to participate in social decisionmaking, even to participate in 
decisions about the juvenile death penalty—to wonder this. 
So we can see that this analogy, between a consensus in the natural 
sciences and a consensus in the law, is being made to carry a great deal 
of weight in Waldron’s Foreign Law paper.  The more any such foreign 
law consensus rests on moral sentiments (or, indeed, even on people’s 
beliefs about some real, mind-independent moral truth where it is the 
case that they have no agreed method for getting at such claimed moral 
truths),33 the less such a consensus in law resembles a consensus in the 
natural sciences. 
B.  Global Warming and Other Examples 
In the absence of the sort of empiricist worldview I have traced above, 
it is not clear why anyone, anywhere, would care in the least that a 
scientific consensus may be emerging as regards global warming (or 
indeed be motivated to challenge its underpinnings and assumptions or 
even know where to start in attempting to do so). 
In other words, consensus in the natural sciences is ultimately governed 
by—and open to being changed by—the imposed, mind-independent 
realities of the external, causal world.  Imagine yourself on the eve of 
testing the first ever atomic bomb or watching the first ever attempt to 
fly a fixed-wing airplane.  Some experts in physics, in chemistry, in 
advanced mathematics will think this atomic bomb will work.  Other 
experts will not.  A consensus may even have crystallized around one 
view or the other.  But in no way will the answer to whether the bomb 
 32. However difficult and demanding of ingenuity and of familiarity with past 
results such testing might need to be—indeed however much it might amount to far, far 
more than mere “idiosyncratic observations.”  Id. at 138. 
 33. This is the very point Waldron himself so effectively makes.  See Jeremy 
Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158, 173 
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (“The point is that there is nothing equivalent in morals [to 
scientific methodology], nothing that even begins to connect the idea of there being a 
fact of the matter with the idea of there being some way to proceed when people 
disagree.”).  In brief, his point there is that even if there were real, mind-independent 
moral truths, we humans not only disagree about what such truths might be, we also 
disagree about how anyone should go about finding them.  And of course, as a self-
declared noncognitivist himself, Waldron sees moral evaluations in terms of sentiments, 
not in terms of claimed true beliefs. 
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works or not depend upon that consensus.  No, any such consensus is 
merely a good indication of how to wager if you are an educated layman.  
The same is true as regards whether that fixed-wing airplane will fly or 
not.  The proof will be in the eating. 
One could go on and on and on in the same vein.  Take stem cell 
research.  Notice that the rights and wrongs of such research are 
independent of whether the fruits of such research—research into how 
the material world actually works and how to manipulate certain human 
cells so as to produce treatments that may cure or alleviate paralysis or 
Parkinson’s disease or other ailments—will be successful.  The scientific 
side of such research would ultimately be open to testing.  It is the 
myriad interlinked causal relationships that exist in the material world, 
and the extent to which the researchers have understood those imposed 
relationships, that will determine whether this stem cell research achieves 
anything beneficial for human health. 
By contrast, the rights and wrongs of such research do not look to be 
open to any such test or testing—unless of course one is a utilitarian or 
other consequentialist for whom the right thing to do is the thing that 
delivers the most cumulative happiness or satisfaction.34  Once that 
absence of any imposed, mind-independent, empirical test is conceded, 
one might fairly ask the following: What does any consensus that may 
happen to develop around the rights and wrongs of such research 
represent?  Is it something more than the view of some number of other 
people?  If there be no underlying mind-independent truth that exists (or 
at least that can be known by any agreed procedures), then why should 
we pay heed to the consensus that has developed?  Or, perhaps more to 
the point of this Article, why should our unelected judges pay heed to 
the consensus view of some group of overseas unelected judges, and 
possibly lock us into that view, rather than paying heed to—or 
leaving this issue of stem cell research to be decided by—our elected 
representatives? 
 34. See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 12.  In a sense, 
utilitarians dissolve their oughts into ises, into questions about which actions are likely—
given all we know at present about the world—to deliver best consequences.  For them, 
moral rights and wrongs are a function of what does or does not happen in the external, 
causal world.  See James Allan, Internal and Engaged or External and Detached?, 12 
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 5–14 (1999), reprinted in JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY AND 
ANTIPATHY 3, 3–13 (2002).  Such utilitarian/consequentialist views are minority ones 
these days, though by no means insignificant. 




That last question ought to be an especially challenging one for 
Jeremy Waldron. 
C. Epidemics Originating in America and the Juvenile                        
Death Penalty 
Waldron gives the specific example of an epidemic which originates 
in the United States.  That fact about its origins should not “preclude[] 
Americans’ turning to foreign scientists for guidance,”35 he says.  I 
wholeheartedly agree.  One would be foolish not to consider and weigh 
up—and of course go on to test—any widespread views of scientists 
with knowledge of epidemics.  Any such group’s view can be checked 
and tested; the fact that such a group of scientists might be foreigners is 
wholly irrelevant to whether their view proves able to withstand testing. 
When we leave the realm of the natural sciences, though, and any 
consensus of opinion there, and turn to some consensus of opinion in the 
realm of law, we need to try to be quite specific about what we are 
“checking and rechecking” that consensus of opinion against.36  No 
longer will it be the Dean of Medicine of Harvard University or of 
Oxford University, some person or group whose opinion on the cause of 
an epidemic and on methods to end it can be tested against the mind-
independent, imposed realities of the external, causal world.  Now it will 
be the Chief Justice of the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
consensus view of those judges on the juvenile death penalty.  Or maybe 
it will be the consensus view of the Canadian judges on gay marriage.37  
Or why not of the Irish judges on abortion38 or the Turkish judges on 
girls wearing headscarves to school?39 
In this legal realm we can ask the question we asked earlier of the 
realm of the natural sciences: Is some consensus of the top judges’ 
views, in and of itself, determinative of whether that consensus is 
correct?  This time put yourself in the shoes of the Chief Justice rather 
than the Dean of Medicine.  Against what does the Chief Justice assess 
 35. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144. 
 36. Id. at 139. 
 37. See Halpern v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 177, 185–93; 
Barbeau v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [2003] 12 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 33, 37–41. 
 38. See Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.); Soc’y for the Prot. of the 
Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1997] I.R. 753, 757 (Ir.). 
 39. For a comprehensive discussion see The Secretary-General, Interim Report of 
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,  add. 1, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/280/Add.1 (Aug. 11, 2000).  The 
leading United Kingdom case on headscarves in schools is R v. Governors of Denbigh 
High School, [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
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effectiveness and check results?  Is it something other than “the 
consensus of views of other expert judges?” 
Now in one sense the answer to that last question will be an obvious 
“yes.”  Judges swear to do justice “according to law.”  There are very 
few areas of law these days into which statutes do not intrude and have a 
decisive effect.  In many areas, too, as in my mooted queries above, a 
country’s constitution or bill of rights will be relevant.  So it is not just 
the first order moral opinion of the judge, or even the consensus moral 
opinion of the preponderance of judges—though in some bill of rights 
cases it can appear to come close to that.  These opinions have to be 
rechecked against the legislature’s statutes, the country’s constitution, 
and the consensus opinions of that jurisdiction’s past judges.  In law, any 
consensus of judges’ opinions is always directed towards some law or 
some constitutional provision.  Their personal opinions are not determinative, 
as though they could legislate on a blank slate (or certainly it is widely 
hoped that this is not generally the case).40 
Yet this concession does not help sustain the plausibility of Waldron’s 
analogy.  In law, it may well be that not only the policy views, principle 
judgments, and rights-based opinions of judges matter; it may generally 
be that such views, judgments, and opinions of legislators and of 
constitution-makers matter too.  But there is nothing mind-independent 
in any of that.  When the Chief Justice “check[s] and recheck[s]”41 her 
results she is doing something qualitatively different to what the Dean of 
Medicine is doing when he checks and rechecks his against the mind-
independent realities of the external, causal world.  What he checks his 
results against “is characteristic of true science.”42  What the Chief 
Justice checks hers against is not.43 
 40. Ronald Dworkin urges a theory of interpretation whereby his perfect, 
superhuman judge Hercules makes the best fit he can of the first nine chapters, of all the 
settled law (constitutional provisions, case law, statutes, and more) of a jurisdiction.  
Hercules is not to decide hard cases by imposing his own first order moral or other 
views.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–130 (1977). 
 41. Waldron, supra note 13, at 139. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Notice what Waldron says of the natural sciences: “On the analogy I have been 
using, what characterizes a consensus in biology or epidemiology is not just that it is an 
accumulation of authorities, but that it represents a dense network of checking and 
rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and 
building on one another’s work.”  Id. at 145 (emphasis added).  Yet it is precisely the 
phrase I have here put in italics that finds no real equivalent in the realm of law.  




That is not to say that in law no good grounds may exist for ever 
paying heed to the views of other experts, be they foreigners, elected 
legislators, or unelected judges.  It is simply to say that in my view 
Waldron’s attempt to equate (or, perhaps less strongly, to analogize 
between) the law of nations and the established body of scientific 
findings fails.  It is simply unpersuasive to claim that “solutions to 
certain kinds of problems in the law might get established in the way 
scientific theories are established.”44 
That means that Waldron’s attempt to harness for the realm of law the 
same sense of solid, objective, timeless knowledge that exists (and for 
good reason exists) in the realm of the natural sciences is not successful.  
If American judges ought to cite and consider and weigh the consensus 
of opinion of foreign judges, it cannot be because that consensus 
represents what it does in the natural sciences, namely the currently 
existing best understanding by us limited, biological humans of the 
underlying, mind-independent reality of our external causal world.45 
The realm of law is not analogous to the realm of the natural sciences 
in offering us humans that sort of indisputable knowledge; if it were, 
then refusals to at least consider or cite or weigh or be guided by any 
consensus that may have emerged in other “civilized nations”46 would 
appear to be perverse or xenophobic, if not downright irrational.  But as 
I have argued, that analogy is highly flawed.  The law of nations—ius 
gentium—may, as Waldron says, provide “the accumulated wisdom of 
the world on rights and justice.”47  Yet when he goes on to make the 
comparison to the natural sciences, and to say that “[i]n both instances, 
the goal was the accumulation of knowledge, not just the validation of 
individual intuitions,” Waldron goes too far.48  Whatever the goal may 
have been, the type of knowledge produced is not analogous.49 
Credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building on one another’s work?  Yes.  Experimental 
duplication?  No. 
 44. Id. at 144. 
 45. Having said that, it is trite to say that current best understanding is not 
infallible.  On occasion outliers prove correct.  But such outliers do not suggest theories 
that involve discarding all the known laws of physics and more—they do not propose 
what amount to miracles.  See David Hume’s unsurpassed treatment of what would be 
needed to believe in miracles in DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 109–31 (L.A. Selby-
Bigge & P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1975) (1777). 
 46. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144. 
 47. Id. at 138. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Likewise, the grounds for “expect[ing] our scientists to look only to findings 
we had reason to trust” would differ from the grounds for restricting our legal inquiry “to 
consensus among ‘civilized’ or ‘freedom-loving’ countries.”  Id. at 145 (citing Reynolds 
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879)). 
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At the risk of belaboring the point, consider this assertion: “Maybe we 
should not give weight to courts in Zimbabwe or the Sudan.  By analogy 
we might not expect our public health officials to look to North Korea 
for guidance in their response to a possible avian flu epidemic.”50  Yet 
dozens of countries around the world today—and no doubt a good many 
nonstate organizations—do look for guidance to North Korea in the 
realm of scientific know-how.  True, it is in the subrealm of nuclear 
weapons production and atomic bomb making, not avian flu prevention, 
but the point remains.  The “scientific spirit”51 to which Waldron refers 
does not depend on (indeed can be wholly divorced from) feelings of 
revulsion, abhorrence of Darfuresque slaughter, or disgust at Mugabean 
thuggery—all presumably factors in shying away from Zimbabwean and 
Sudanese case law precedents.  In science, however, it is ultimately what 
works, what withstands duplication, what succeeds in harnessing the 
external, causal world to one’s needs, that provides knowledge.  So here 
again the two sorts of consensus appear quite distinct. 
Without recourse to that flawed science analogy, the case for appealing to 
what Waldron describes as “the law of nations” for guidance is significantly 
less straightforward.  It may become dependent on a host of other 
factors, not least the ease with which the elected branches can respond to 
any decisions of the unelected judiciary that have been influenced by 
this “accumulated legal wisdom of mankind.”52  Whether it is the 
elected legislators or the unelected judges that have been so guided in 
their labors may matter too.  In fact, one’s underlying view of the 
relative role and competencies of the various branches of government, 
including the deciding of questions of rights, may come into play once 
the realm of law is seen as importantly unlike the realm of the n
III. SOME FURTHER DISTINCTIONS 
Let us recall just precisely who it is who is here “present[ing] law . . . 
as essentially a problem-solving enterprise”53 as part of his self-declared 
larger “aim . . . to present a theory of the citation of foreign law.”54  This 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 147. 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Id. at 146. 
 54. Id. 
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has said all of the following, and much more of the 
sam
ate as a mode of final 
determine a resolution of the issue in a way that is beyond reasonable 
the procedures of a Supreme Court hearing will 
t outcome. . . . 
a decision as the 
osner thinks that for the moment such a strategy is futile 
onsible . . . . 
 I think Posner is right about all this.60 
 
is not one of the many, many writers who prefers judges to legislators—
at least when it comes to deciding rights-based cases—and who tends to 
downplay reasonable disagreement in favor of moral certainties and 
obfuscating abstractions.  No, this is Professor Jeremy Waldron, the very 
same person who 
e, in the past: 
[J]udicial review of legislation is inappropri
decisionmaking in a free and democratic society.55 
In the United States, it is indisputable both that the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights have a bearing on how [“abortion, affirmative action, the legitimacy of 
government redistribution or interference in the marketplace, the rights of 
criminal suspects, the precise meaning of religious toleration, minority cultural 
rights, the regulation of speech and spending in electoral campaigns, and so 
on”]56 are to be resolved and that the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not 
themselves 
dispute.57 
 These [anti-Bill of Rights] thoughts . . . are reinforced when we consider 
how much room there is for honest and good faith disagreement among citizens 
on the topic of rights.  Things might be different if principles of right were self-
evident or if there were a philosophical elite who could be trusted to work out 
once and for all what rights we have and how they are to be balanced against 
other considerations. . . .  [T]he existence of good faith disagreement is undeniable.58 
There is no guarantee that 
secure a jus
 . . . . 
 . . . [A]lthough the justices support their votes with lengthy opinions drafted 
by recent graduates of our law schools, the quality of a given opinion has no 
impact whatever on the weight accorded to the vote it supports.  Though justices 
(like legislators) do attempt to influence one another, in the final analysis the 
most eloquent jurisprudence counts the same in determining 
shabbiest piece of ill-tempered ideology.59 
No doubt, as I write, dozens of scholars and students are concocting ingenious 
arguments to show that the U.S. Constitution requires this change [to recognize 
homosexual marriage].  There is a sort of competition underway, and the 
winner—the hero whose argument ultimately prevails in a Supreme Court 
decision requiring states to recognize same-sex marriages—will receive the 
same accolades as the heroes of Brown, Griswold, Roe, and all the other 
landmark cases.  But P
and irresp
 . . . . 
 55. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1348. 
y Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13 L & P . 27, 
aldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597, 610–11 (2000) 
 56. Id. at 1367. 
 57. Id. at 1368. 
 58. Waldron, Right-Based Critique, supra note 7, at 49. 
 59. Jerem AW  HIL
29, 31 (1994). 
 60. Jeremy W
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 The moral philosopher pretends to offer some such apparatus—analogous 
to the instruments or methodologies of science—an apparatus that will enable us 
to bring our moral perceptions into line with each other and with “moral 
reality.”  But the offer is bogus. . . .  For if one picks one’s philosopher carefully 
enough, one can always find an analytical instrument to vindicate one’s most 
cherished convictions . . . .61 
Posner is entitled to respond that judges (and other law-makers) don’t always 
have the time or resources to make such fine discriminations among the 
qualities and characters of those who offer them advice or send them amicus 
briefs.  For the judges, the question has to be: is the fact that someone is a well-
known philosopher a reason by itself for paying particular attention to his 
opinions on a real-world legal issue.  That is a question that has to be answered 
wholesale, not retail, for the most part.62 
The requirement [in Bill of Rights cases] that judges give reasons for their 
decisions could, in principle, be a vehicle for moral reasoning and for assuring 
the public that moral issues are being decided on moral grounds.  But, in fact, it 
mostly isn’t; it is mostly a device for hiding the Court’s decisions behind a cloud 
of technical jurisprudence.63 
The very same Jeremy Waldron who said all those things, and did so 
in the context of disparaging Bill of Rights adjudication generally, now 
wants to argue that the law of nations will sometimes be appropriate to 
be referred to, indeed deferred to, including in controversial Bill of Rights 
cases before the Supreme Court on issues such as “whether the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the juvenile death penalty.”64 
Step two of my argument will attempt to draw a distinction between 
judges considering (or being guided by or weighing or referring to or 
whatever the degree of controlling force one prefers) some sort of 
foreign law consensus in constitutional, Bill of Rights cases, on the one 
hand, and considering it in all other cases, on the other. 
However, let us start with an easier distinction to make, between 
whether it is “ever appropriate for American courts to cite or defer to 
foreign law”65 and whether it is ever appropriate for elected legislators 
to do so.  When it comes to democratically elected legislators, or indeed 
elected members of the executive branch, all of Waldron’s arguments in 
(c ations omitted). it
Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89, 105 
0. 
mphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 618 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). 
 63. 
(2002). 
 64. Waldron, supra note 13, at 14
 65. Id. at 129 (e
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ely and utterly deferred to.  On what basis could 
an
mend or appeal them using the 
ex
 
favour of at least considering “the law of nations”66 or “ius gentium”67 
or “the accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and justice”68 or “a 
consensus in . . . the law”69 or however you want to put it, seem wholly 
uncontroversial.  So if some group of elected representatives of the 
people come to the conclusion that there are serious problems with the 
way tort law operates in the field of, say, personal injuries—that it is an 
inefficient way to compensate the injured because too big a slice of the 
compensation dollar currently goes to lawyers and insurers and the 
running of courts, that it unduly distorts behaviour by overencouraging 
risk aversion, and that who is affected rests almost entirely on raw 
luck—then why should not such legislators look to New Zealand’s no 
fault personal injury scheme70 or Canada’s, Australia’s, and the United 
Kingdom’s procedural rules that shift well over half of a defendant’s 
legal costs on to the plaintiff when a lawsuit is unsuccessful.71  Other 
legal regimes can be considered, weighed, referred to, used to guide 
changes, or even complet
yone possibly object? 
Remember, if the reforms that have been modeled on New Zealand’s 
legal regime in this area, or the United Kingdom’s, prove ultimately to 
be unpopular or unsuccessful then they can be altered again or even 
changed back.  We are mooting legislative reforms after all.  Whatever 
amount of guidance, direction, or instruction may have flowed from 
some overseas consensus, it will ultimately be the elected lawmakers 
here who will enact such changes, who will be held accountable by the 
voters for them, and who can always a
act same legislative procedural tools. 
Relatedly, when it comes to elected legislators referring to, indeed 
deferring to, foreign law models, there is simply no need at all to justify 
this copying on the basis of some purported analogy to the natural 
sciences—some hint or suggestion that New Zealand’s no fault tort 
system happens to rest on a timeless, objective, mind-independent body 
of indisputable knowledge that is the product of testing, experimental 
duplication, possible falsification, and that got “established in the way 
that scientific theories are established.”72  No, even where a majority of 
 66. Id. at 132. 
 67. Id. at 134. 
 68. Id. at 138. 
 69. Id. at 139. 
 70. As indeed Waldron himself suggests in Jeremy Waldron, Moments of 
Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 389 
& n.1 (David Owen ed., 1995). 
 71. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 3132, pt. 44 (U.K.). 
 72. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144. 
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nothing much more than “individual intuitions,”73 that is 
ap




 of mankind, embodied in 
 
elected legislators are motivated to imitate or copy some foreign legal 
initiative on 
propriate. 
Therefore, in contesting Waldron’s claims about the role of any 
foreign law consensus we need to be extremely clear about whether it is 
the judges or legislators who are being guided (or seeking guidance) in 
their labors.  This initial distinction is crucial, as next to no one—and 
certainly no
fluenced. 
Alas, Professor Waldron himself is not always as transparent 
 distinction as we might have wished.   Consider this passage: 
Another way of putting the matter is this: We may have simply decided, as a 
matter of national will, not to rule out the death penalty altogether.  But a case 
can still be made that we should not just decide whether it is cruel or unjust to 
execute adults for crimes committed when they were children.  Since it is an 
open question in our system whether this practice is constitutional, we should 
look not just for a decision but for a way of figuring out the complex rights and 
wrongs of the matter, as well as the vexing issues of culpability and responsibility.  
In addressing this problem, we need all the help we can get.  If these issues have 
been wrestled with in a number of other jurisdictions, then our commitment to 
the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end product of their labors 
for guidance.  So even if the modern death penalty is quintessentially and 
peculiarly American, the accumulated legal wisdom
ius gentium, may still have something to offer us.75 
I have put all the first person plural pronouns, save the first one, in 
italics.  In the context of Waldron’s Foreign Law paper it is clear that all 
these italicized pronouns refer to the unelected judiciary, not to all the 
voters who have a Waldronian right to participate in social decisionmaking 
(through their elected representatives), even about whether to execute 
adults for murders committed when children.  Each “we” and “our” and 
“us” who will be struggling with “whether the Eighth Amendment forbids 
the juvenile death penalty”76 refers to a judicial “we” or to a judicial 
“us.”77  Waldron’s use of a deceptively embracing pronoun obscures that 
fact; it goes some way towards blurring the distinction—the elected 
 73. Id. at 138. 
 74. Though he does say “the law of nations is available to lawmakers and 
judges . . . .”  Id. at 133. 
 75. Id. at 140 (first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth emphases added). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 139, 140–41, 143–47 (employing similar usages of the first person 
plural pronoun, for example, “of course it is ultimately our decision . . . .”). 
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the issue of the appropriateness of 
re
aldron sometimes calls the 
“a







legislator as opposed to unelected judge distinction—that I think absolutely 
needs to be made when considering 
ferring or deferring to foreign law. 
With that distinction made we can now turn back to another 
distinction I believe needs to be made—between judges deciding Bill of 
Rights cases78 and judges deciding non-Bill of Rights cases.  The key 
difference here is the ease with which the elected branches of 
government can respond to any decisions of the unelected judiciary that 
have been shaped or directed by what W
ccumulated legal wisdom of mankind.”79 
Unelected American judges interpreting a Bill of Rights that is 
entrenched in a Constitution which is next to impossible to change 
effectively have the last word on such issues.  Their view on whether to 
pay heed to some foreign law consensus cannot be rever
 statute; the elected legislators cannot gainsay them. 
In all other areas of law where judges might wish to look to some 
foreign law consensus this is not the case.  American judges who refer 
to, and perhaps even defer to, how Canadian and Irish courts—or even to 
how a more grandiose law of nations or consensus of civilized states— 
happen to treat litigants’ claims for damages arising from unlawful 
arrest, can be met with a legislative response.  The Alien Tort Statute80 
that the judges have interpreted in the light of this consensus can be 
amended or repealed by Congress—assuming, as I do for the mom
at there are no Bill of Rights or other Constitutional issues raised. 
True, it can be difficult in a practical sense for an elected legislature to 
respond to every single court decision, not least because there is only so 
much political capital to draw upon while so many issues are seen (by 
some) to warrant legislative action.  And it is true, too, that the 
seemingly simple power of statutory interpretation—without any over
course to constitutional interpretation—should never be underestimated. 
Nevertheless, I think this distinction between Bill of Rights cases and 
other cases is a worthwhile one all the same.  Only as regards the latter is 
the elected legislature left with (admittedly varying) room to put forward 
its view and ultimately prevail.  As we have seen, almost no one objects 
to legislators having scope to pay heed to some perceived consensus of 
 78. Here, I use the label “Bill of Rights cases” to encompass not simply U.S.-style 
entrenched bills of rights cases and U.K.-style statutory bills of rights cases but also 
other constitutional cases, including federal separation of powers cases.  My strong 
hunch, however, is that it will be in the realm of rights-based cases that judges are most 
inclined to look abroad. 
 79. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140. 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  The Alien Tort Statute was first enacted in 1789.  
See Waldron, supra note 13, at 131. 
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 a segment of the lengthy 
passage I cited above, namely the following: 
 
civilized states.  Where those same legislators are left in a reasonable 
position to respond to and countermand some use the judges have made 
of such a perceived consensus, the objections to it must surely be 
werful than when the legislators can do nothing and are impotent. 
Or rather, that is a position and a distinction which seems to me to be 
one incumbent upon all Waldronians to take and to make—including 
Jeremy Waldron himself.  It should be comparatively easier for them and 
him to allow a role for the citation of forei
ample, compared to constitutional law.”81 
Those not inclined to accept Waldron’s anti-Bill of Rights, anti-
judicial review arguments, of course, are in no such position.  Rights-based 
decisionmaking by unelected judges82 does not overly concern them.  
Some even revel in it.  For them, whatever theory they may devise as 
regards the appropriateness of citing foreign law, it will not be one 
where a right to participate in social decisionmaking—
ht of rights—is a crucial, fundamental consideration. 
Accordingly, the need to distinguish between unelected judges being 
guided by a foreign law consensus in Bill of Rights cases, as opposed to 
this happening in all other cases, is one I am here only attributing to
aldronians.83  For them though it is a second important distinction to make. 
That said, Waldron himself attempts to finesse this second distinction, 
or at least that is what one might infer from
 81. Waldron, supra note 13, at 129.  That said, any role for overseas case law 
citation in the private law sphere could not, in my view, be founded on the analogy to 
science.  Furthermore, the fact Waldronians would find it easier to resort to the practice 
of overseas case law citation in the private law sphere as opposed to the Bill of Rights 
sphere does not entail that they would actually choose to do so.  As I note below, there 
are practical and procedural difficulties with any such practice—difficulties that may 
lead some Waldronians to forswear such citation even in the private law sphere. 
 82. Even decisions that amount to having the last word on where to draw a host of 
social policy lines when it comes to “abortion, affirmative action, the legitimacy of 
government redistribution or interference in the marketplace, the rights of criminal 
suspects, the precise meaning of religious toleration, minority cultural rights, the 
regulation of speech and spending in electoral campaigns” and much else too, including 
on the issue of the juvenile death penalty.  Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, 
supra note 7, at 1367. 
 83. Non-Waldronians need not make this distinction.  Nevertheless, non-Waldronians 
may still, on other grounds including the practical and procedural ones I mention below, 
decide not to cite, refer to, or defer to foreign law in any sort of case. 




Since it is an open question in our system whether this practice [of possibly 
executing adults for crimes committed when they were children] is constitutional 
. . . we need all the help we can get. . . .  [And] the accumulated legal wisdom of 
mankind . . . may still have something to offer us.84 
The suggestion there is that judges deciding even Bill of Rights cases 
may have more room—more legitimate room—to decide difficult social 
policy issues when these are “open question[s] in our system.”85 
Yet from the perspective of someone who thinks “disagreements about 
rights [ought to be settled] using . . . legislative institutions,”86 what does 
it matter that judges happen to get to an issue first?  If it be politically 
illegitimate for judges to gainsay what the elected legislature has already 
decided about rights—for all the powerful reasons Waldron himself 
advances and that offer him future possession of the philosopher’s 
stone—then how, precisely, does it become somehow legitimate simply 
by virtue of it being an unsettled area of law which happens to come 
before the courts before it reaches the legislature?  There is no 
immediately plausible answer to those questions that I can see. 
Worse than that, this “open question” metaphor is misleading.  
Legislatures either regulate or they do not regulate.  Yet there are no 
obvious grounds for treating the latter course as not having dealt with a 
situation, as opposed to having made a decision to leave it alone.87  
Waldron’s distinction here rests on a temporal factor—between the 
illegitimacy of later in time second-guessing by judges and the (at least 
sometimes) legitimacy and acceptability of earlier in time decisionmaking 
by judges—that is far from obviously determinative or even important. 
Even worse than that, the effect of the judges opting to decide these 
open questions in the context of Bill of Rights disputes is just as 
antidemocratic—in Waldron’s terms—as in the case of non-open or 
settled questions.  Remember, when the judges do happen to get to an 
issue first, and they then make a decision under the aegis of the 
constitutionalized Bill of Rights, the elected legislature is foreclosed 
from overruling the judges and from deciding this particular issue. 
Hence, my view is that this apparent attempt to finesse the distinction 
between judges deciding Bill of Rights cases as opposed to other sorts of 
cases fails.  When it comes to the unelected judiciary being guided by 
some foreign law consensus it matters which sort of case we are 
 84. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.  For the passage at length, see supra text 
accompanying note 75. 
 85. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.  For the passage at length, see supra text 
accompanying note 75. 
 86. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1360. 
 87. Thanks to Richard Kay for this point. 
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considering—or at least it matters, or should matter, to all of us who are 
Waldronian democrats. 
IV.  DO NOT FORGET THE DISAGREEMENT AND DISSENSUS 
The third step in my argument will be an altogether smaller one.  
Indeed it will be a quintessentially Waldronian one.  It is simply this: We 
must not forget the fact that smart, reasonable, well-intentioned, even 
nice people simply disagree about how rights ought to play out, how 
they should relate to one another, when other considerations outweigh 
them, and even what falls under their aegis. 
In his Foreign Law paper Waldron says that “Ronald Dworkin has 
made Riggs [v. Palmer] the leitmotif of an entire jurisprudence, arguing 
that law comprises deep legal principles as well as rules embodied in 
texts and precedents.”88  In a similar spirit it would not be unfair to say 
that Waldron himself has made this emphasis on dissensus and 
disagreement—reasonable disagreement amongst reasonable people 
where there is no agreed or uncontentious procedures or methods for 
resolving that disagreement—the leitmotif of his critique of bills of 
rights and his discussions of rights.  It lies at the heart of his defence of 
“letting the numbers count” representative democracy and of his 
opposition to “strong judicial review in the US States.”89  It undergirds 
his powerful defence of the elected legislature against the pretensions 
and purported moral superiority of the elected judiciary.  In no small 
way, it may one day help him to possess the philosopher’s stone. 
How odd, then, to find Waldron asserting that “[t]he real contrast 
between those who oppose and those who defend the use of foreign law 
in American legal reasoning is not that jurists in the first group are 
parochial and the second cosmopolitan.  It is rather this contrast between 
law as will and law as reason.”90 
Yet in the context of Bill of Rights cases of the sort I distinguished in 
step two above, why should Waldron expect opposition to his defence of 
the use of foreign law only to come from those who see law as will?  If 
 88. Waldron, supra note 13, at 136 (footnote omitted). 
 89. Waldron, supra note 8, at 442; see James Allan & Andrew Geddis, Waldron 
and Opposing Judicial Review—Except, Sort of, in New Zealand, N.Z.L.J., Apr. 2006, at 
94, 94–96 (discussing my and Andrew Geddis’s response to Waldron’s pessimism 
regarding New Zealand’s legislative mechanisms). 
 90. Waldron, supra note 13, at 146.  A page earlier Waldron says: “I do not expect 
any of this to convince those who see law as purely a matter of will.”  Id. at 145. 




we happen to live in a world in which people (who, for the sake of 
argument, all accept “law as reason” in some similar way to Waldron) 
disagree about what reason demands when it comes to rights and 
morality, and who see no substantive, appeal-to-reason-itself way to 
resolve those disagreements, then resolution of those disagreements will 
ultimately be on the basis of some set of procedures—such as letting the 
numbers count either amongst all voters or amongst the top judges only. 
Even more to the point, the disagreements between those smart, well-
intentioned people will not stop being reasonable disagreements because 
one side can point to a consensus of overseas judges who agree with 
them.91  That would only be so if overseas judges, or some consensus of 
them, were able or likely to find or discover correct substantive answers 
to these rights-based issues—or rather, if the fact they claimed to be able 
to do so, in and of itself, could convince those who disagreed. 
However, that is plainly not the case. 
Hence, in Bill of Rights cases, where a decision of the unelected 
judiciary effectively locks the rest of us out of having any input—where 
our right to participate, the right of rights in Waldron’s eyes, is taken 
away—opposition to “the use of foreign law in American legal 
reasoning”92 can be based on procedural grounds.  Not all opponents of 
such usage will be “those who see law as purely a matter of will.”93 
Where, as Waldron himself argues,94 all resolutions of rights-based 
disputes will ultimately be on a procedural basis, not on a substantive 
basis (such as who writes the most morally wonderful opinion with the 
most references to John Stuart Mill), what is so attractive about this 
particular procedure of resolving disputes by referring to, or deferring to, 
foreign law? 
To start, there are no hard and fast rules governing the use of overseas 
precedents.  Indeed, there are no rules at all.  Nothing like the notion of 
stare decisis exists to help in choosing between the myriad overseas 
precedents on offer—nothing to guide the judges in determining when 
overseas decisions should be cited, which decisions should be cited, 
what weight particular decisions should be accorded, and so on.95 
 91. In the vast preponderance of instances it would be far more accurate to 
describe this “consensus of overseas judges” in terms that recognize it is a majority of 
such judges in a majority of cases. 
 92. Id. at 146. 
 93. Id. at 145. 
 94. See, e.g., Waldron, Right-Based Critique, supra note 7, at 39–41. 
 95. For an extensive discussion on American courts, see James Allan & Grant 
Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in 
American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006).  For a full discussion of this point 
from the perspective of a sitting judge, see Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have 
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Next, there is some evidence from overseas to suggest that the citation 
of overseas authority in rights-based litigation leads to a gradual ratchet-
up effect, that on average, over time, this practice results in judges 
extending and broadening the ambit of various rights and the scope and 
range of their application.96 
In a different vein, there is a problem with comparative size or relative 
populations.  The main common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have a combined population of just 
over a third of America’s.  These are likely to be some of the jurisdictions 
most often cited.  Yet even were one a diehard internationalist, it is not 
obvious why a consensus of Canadian, British, Australian, and New 
Zealand judges’ views should count for any more than the views of 
Texan, Georgian, Floridian, or even Californian judges. 
Understood as a procedure for resolving reasonable disagreements 
over rights issues, this method of appealing to foreign law even raises a 
danger Waldron himself moots, “the prospect that a judge will invoke 
this theory opportunistically, picking and choosing the consensus he 
relies on, to reinforce conclusions that he wanted to reach anyway.”97  
And, of course, one can be aware of that danger even while resoundingly 
rejecting the notion that law is “purely a matter of will.”98  In fact, I see 
no reason why such a danger might not be seen as of crucial (perhaps 
determinative) significance or moment when it comes to assessing 
appeals to foreign law as a procedure for resolving disagreement, rather 
than as a science-like method for delivering solid, objective, timeless, 
mind-independent knowledge. 
Waldron himself alludes to the procedural shortcomings of deciding 
cases based on the views of moral philosophers, a procedure not unrelated 
to this foreign law one.  Recall, from above, what he says about that: 
Our Own Laws: The Court Should Never View a Foreign Legal Decision as a Precedent 
in Any Way, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 40. 
 96. See James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, The Citation of Overseas 
Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 
OTAGO L. REV. 433, 441–42 (2007).  In a study of reported New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act cases at the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal levels from enactment in 1990 to 
April, 2006, in which reference was made to overseas precedents in interpreting the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right at issue appears to be extended in some way or other 
in 40% of all such cases.  It is extended four times more often than it is given an 
interpretation narrower than it had before the court’s decision.  See id. app. H at 458–67. 
 97. Waldron, supra note 13, at 146. 
 98. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted). 




Posner is entitled to respond that judges (and other law-makers) don’t always 
have the time or resources to make such fine discriminations among the 
qualities and characters of those who offer them advice or send them amicus 
briefs.  For judges, the question has to be: is the fact that someone is a well-
known philosopher a reason by itself for paying particular attention to his 
opinions on a real-world legal issue.  That is a question that has to be answered 
wholesale, not retail, for the most part.99 
The moral philosopher pretends to offer some such apparatus—analogous to the 
instruments or methodologies of science—an apparatus that will enable us to 
bring our moral perceptions into line with each other and with “moral reality.”  
But the offer is bogus. . . .  For if one picks one’s philosopher carefully enough, 
one can always find an analytical instrument to vindicate one’s most cherished 
convictions . . . .100 
Moreover, those who do share concerns about referring to, or deferring 
to, foreign law as a procedure for resolving rights-based disagreements 
are unlikely to be reassured by the surprisingly candid comments of the 
President of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
   In the ACLU’s ideal world, all individual rights would receive the maximum 
protection consistent with civil libertarian principles, and, in support of our 
claims for each right, we would cite whatever source of legal authority offered 
the most protection—not only the US Constitution, but also, alternatively, state 
constitutions, federal or state statutes, or international human rights principles.  
This is an upward-ratcheting approach.  In other words, the US Constitution—as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court—sets a floor under our individual rights, but 
it should not set a ceiling over them. 
   Under this civil libertarian approach, to the extent that increased protection for 
individual rights is offered by other binding legal authorities, domestic or 
international, they should prevail over US constitutional law.  In contrast, 
though, whenever these other authorities purport to undermine rights protected 
by the US Constitution, the Constitution trumps them.  In the same vein, we 
believe that government officials should respect fundamental rights even if they 
are not expressly articulated in any constitution, treaty, or any other explicit 
source of law.101 
Such comments completely ignore the obvious Waldronian rejoinder 
that people disagree about how rights ought to play out, and about what 
is their “maximum protection consistent with civil libertarian principles.”102 
Note, as well, that the preceding arguments in this section have been 
made on the supposition that the distinction between “law as reason” and 
 99. Waldron, supra note 60, at 623 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying 
note 62. 
 100. Waldron, supra note 60, at 618 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying 
note 61. 
 101. Nadine Strossen, Liberty and Equality: Complementary, Not Competing, 
Constitutional Commitments, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 149, 153 
(footnotes omitted). 
 102. Id. 
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“law as will” has not been overdrawn by Waldron, though truth be told I 
am not wholly convinced that that is in fact the case.103 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have taken issue with recent claims made by Jeremy 
Waldron in the Harvard Law Review, claims defending the use of 
foreign law in American legal reasoning.  I have argued that in the 
context of Bill of Rights cases, where the elected legislature is shut out 
from responding to the decisions of the unelected judges, the appeal to 
overseas precedents is not an obviously attractive procedure for resolving 
rights-based disagreements.  Or rather, I have argued that this is the case 
for Waldronians, for those who broadly accept Jeremy Waldron’s defence 
of the elected legislature and his general anti-bills of rights position.104 
My argument has been that Waldron’s underlying thesis in his 
Foreign Law paper is at odds with the core of his own anti-judicial 
review, anti-bill of rights position.  My response involved a detailed 
attempt to refute Waldron’s analogy between the law of nations and the 
established body of scientific findings.  Waldron himself explicitly rests 
much, if not all, of the force of his defence of appeals to foreign law on 
just this analogy.  Having asked “what reasons there are for taking this 
[defence of the use of foreign law] line of thought seriously,”105 
Waldron spends over three pages “set[ting] out this analogy in 106
If my attack on that analogy was successful, and one finds recourse to 
the analogy flawed and unpersuasive, the case for appealing to the law 
of nations for guidance does not disappear with it.  For legislators, the 
case for such appeals remains immensely strong.  Relatedly, where the 
elected legislature is in a position to respond to judicial decisions 
invoking foreign law, there may possibly also be a case for it.  It is in 
Bill of Rights cases, where the elected legislature is left with no room to 
 103. First off, the bare concept of reason lacks substantive content.  Nor is there any 
knock-out grounds for preferring, say, a Kantian conception of reason to a Humean one.  
And assuming one can get over those hurdles, it seems likely that on any conception of 
reason the work it will do in resolving cases will run out, even for courts.  See Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 70–72 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2001) (presenting another writer 
with doubts about this distinction). 
 104. Again, this is not to imply that all non-Waldronians will or should find such 
use of foreign law attractive. 
 105. Waldron, supra note 13, at 143. 
 106. Id. 




respond to the judges, that the case for appealing to the law of nations 
clearly seems to fail.  More exactly, it seems to fail from the vantage of a 
Waldronian democrat. 
That leaves two further matters to be raised.  Firstly, I have deliberately 
skirted around the entire issue of how a Waldronian judge ought to 
decide Bill of Rights cases.  That further issue is clearly, if indirectly, 
relevant to the issues I have been discussing.  However, it is also a 
complex and tricky issue, one that deserves a separate paper on its 
own—one I have attempted elsewhere.107  Here, let me just comment on 
what to me seems the most that follows if one chooses to consider this 
issue solely from the judge’s perspective, and in particular from the 
perspective of a Waldronian judge who believes that the whole task of 
gainsaying an elected legislature is at core illegitimate.  From that 
vantage it may ultimately be that having accepted the job as a judge one 
has to do something when confronted with a case involving abstract 
rights.  Indeed, it may well be that such a Waldronian judge is at times 
sorely tempted, psychologically, to seek guidance or illumination—or at 
least the comfort of having his or her views confirmed by others.  Were 
that Waldronian judge in those instances to prefer seeking guidance from 
the musings of other judges around the world rather than in the writings 
of philosophers like Dworkin, some observers—including me, perhaps—
might find themselves reluctantly resigned to the practice.  Of course 
that is a world away from actively encouraging and justifying the 
practice in the way Waldron has done in his Foreign Law paper. 
The second further matter involves the ancillary question of whether 
Waldron has changed his mind as regards any of his earlier positions.  
This seems unlikely to me.108  More likely, in my view, is that Waldron 
strongly disapproves of the juvenile death penalty, thinking it plainly 
 107. See James Allan, The Travails of Justice Waldron, in EXPOUNDING THE 
CONSTITUTION (Grant Huscroft ed., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with the 
author). 
 108. This is simply an empirical claim by me, of course.  It is distinct from the issue 
of whether Waldron, in light of the views he expresses in his Foreign Law paper, should 
now go back and reconsider some of his earlier positions, up to and including his 
insistence that the content of rights ought to be committed to the elected legislators.  In 
fact, questions raised by this Foreign Law paper might include: Does an emphasis on 
dissensus and disagreement as regards rights make sense outside of a utilitarian/ 
consequentialist approach?  Does recourse to the “wisdom of the world” regarding rights 
implicitly presuppose a natural law/natural rights understanding of nonlegal rights?  Is a 
position of the sort that says, “[A]ssuming, for the sake of argument, that there are 
objective moral truths, including truths about rights (which makes them strong rights), it 
nevertheless is the case that strong judicial review is inappropriate because of the fact of 
the right to participate and reasonable disagreement”—ultimately an unstable position?  
Does Waldron, or does Waldron not, now think there is a fact-of-the-matter in connection 
with questions about rights? 
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“unjust to execute adults for crimes committed when they were children.”109  
And appeals to “whatever consensus has been reached among the nations 
on this point” would happen to support his substantive moral opinion on 
this matter.110 
It would also, as it happens, be a useful tool in overruling the many 
Americans who disagree as regards the justice of executing adults for 
crimes committed when they were children.  It would be a handy way to 
subvert their right to participate.  I say this as an opponent of capital 
punishment myself.111 
The anti-Bill of Rights Waldron who punctures the pretensions and 
purported moral superiority of the unelected judiciary—of both the 
American and non-American varieties, and who emphasizes the fact 
that dissensus and disagreement on virtually all rights questions is to 
be expected, with no side easily characterized as evil, stupid, or 
uninformed—that Waldron lays out a demanding moral path.  My 
understanding has always been that on that Waldronian moral path, 
when I find that a majority of my fellow citizens disagrees with me in 
their moral judgments, even as regards the juvenile death penalty, the 
remedy is not to urge unelected judges to impose my view on the 
legislature and on all those fellow citizens who disagree with me, even if 
that urging be indirect and wrapped up in an appeal to the law of nations.  
The Waldronian remedy is for me to spend a few Saturdays a month 
campaigning for politicians and political parties who share my view, to 
write newspaper columns urging a change, to participate in the 
democratic process in an effort to change opinions. 
If Waldron is hinting in his Foreign Law paper that the juvenile death 
penalty issue is somehow idiosyncratically distinct from other rights-
based issues, and that disagreement here is in fact unreasonable, then he 
should tell us why that is.  He should lay out his grounds for thinking 
this issue, exceptionally, can be resolved on a substantive rather than 
procedural basis.  He should avoid erecting an erudite and learned 
edifice that, at the end of the day, and whatever else it may do, makes 
less demanding the path of convincing one’s fellow citizens to revise 
their rights-based moral views. 
 109. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140. 
 110. Id. 
 111. On consequentialist grounds and with this caveat—I remain of an open mind 
as regards the question of executing mass-murdering terrorists. 
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For Jeremy Waldron, the philosopher’s stone does not lie down that 
path. 
 
